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The problems of multilingual European Law 
1. Interacting Legal Systems 
A decisive tool for European integration is EU law as an autonomous, sui generis 
supranational legal system, distinct from both national and international law, 
with its own growing body of legal terms and concepts. EU law to a large extent 
permeates and to some extent overlaps the internal legal systems of Member 
States, merging with them to form a new, distinct structure. This structure is 
held together by EU legal texts, as well as principles shaped by case-law from 
the European Court of Justice, such as supremacy, primacy, direct effect, direct 
applicability and the obligation to interpret national law in conformity with EU 
law. EU law is an organised and structured body of legislation, which is distinct 
from Member State law in that it draws on different sources and is created, 
interpreted and applied through different institutions and procedures. 
At the same time, EU law interacts closely with national legal systems, as 
evidenced by the fact that it has adopted various national legal concepts, terms 
and institutions. For example, the title and role of 'Advocate General' has 
been taken from French law. Another example is the term 'cabotage', adopted 
from international law. Through the interaction of legal systems, such terms 
have acquired independent meaning and are now accepted as established EU 
terms in their own right. 
The foundations of EU law can be traced back through a common history 
of 2000 years to Roman law. Yet, as the EU legal system did not come about 
through organic development, it lacks a consistent body of concepts and 
terms. EU legal texts are produced by special legislative procedures involving 
delicate compromise and long negotiation among representatives of disparate 
legal cultures and concepts. On the one hand, this ensures that EU legal texts 
reflect and accommodate various points of view. On the other hand, it makes 
the legislative process more difficult, as legislators representing different 
' Opinion 1/91: Opinion delivered pursuant to the second subparagraph of Article 228 (1) of the 
Treaty - Draft agreement between the Community, on the one hand, and the countries of the 
European Free Trade Association, on the other, relating to the creation of the European Economic 
Area. (ECLI:EU:C:1991:490), and Opinion 1/92: Opinion pursuant to the second subparagraph of 
Article 228 (1) of the EEC Treaty - Draft agreement between the Community, on the one hand, and 
the countries of the European Free Trade Association, on the other, relating to the creation of the 
European Economic Area. (ECLI:EU:C:1992:189). 
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countries and political beliefs need to find a common language and strike the 
right balance between EU and national interests. Judges working with legal 
texts produced in this way often feel that another difficulty, besides the need 
for political bargaining, is codification of the resulting legislation. This may 
be because the EU is multilingual and the texts, which are mosdy in English 
or, at a lesser extent in French, are likely to be drafted by people whose native 
language is not English or French. Unless texts are meticulously drafted, 
difficulties can also arise merely f rom the fact that a term in one language 
doesn't mean exactly the same thing in another language. 
It is probably impossible to produce absolutely equivalent versions of 
legislation in all EU languages. Yet distortions in meaning must be avoided 
so that each language versions intended to produces the same legal effect. 
The main principles of EU law are equality before the law; legal certainty; 
predictable, clear and comprehensible legal provisions; and transparent 
legislation.2 These principles can be upheld only if EU law has the same 
meaning in all language versions. So translations of legal texts should strive to 
ensure that all language versions match. Legal systems can interact well only if 
the precise meanings of legal terms are researched in translation, a seemingly 
technical phase of legislation. This means judging whether a given term is 
used only in an EU context or may be used in a national context as well. 
One approach is to provide more definitions in legislation and to use 
standardised terms and expressions so as to ensure compatibility among legal 
texts, or what could be called ' freedom of movement for definitions'. 
2. Legal definitions and the importance of legal interpretation 
Searching for proper terms has always played a key role in the history of h u m a n 
thought. The definition of a term is a description of the concept to which it 
refers. The most important thing is for the concept itself to be unambiguous 
and clear. A concept is unambiguous if it is sufficiently distinct f rom similar 
concept and clear if its meaning is understood. One of the main features of 
legal language is that it operates with its own set of concepts and terms. In the 
legal set-up, terms and their definitions may be important f rom a number of 
different viewpoints. It is particularly important for terms to be used precisely 
2 Articles 1 and 3 of Treaty on the, European Union, Article 24 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the 
European Union and Articles 21 and 22 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights. 
3 See more: COMBOS, KATALIN: A fogalom-meghatározások jelentősége a Brüsszel I rendelet mó-
dosítása kapcsán, in: A Brüsszel I. rendelet reformja. (Ed: Osztovits, András) Budapest. 2012. Acta 
Caroliensia Conventorum Scientiarum luridico-Politicarum, 2063-4757. 2. 22-33. p. 
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and consistendy in legislation. Producing legislation is a complex cognitive 
process predicated on legal interpretation. Legal terms and concepts must 
be defined precisely and consistendy, as using the same term to refer to 
different concepts will lead readers to different conclusions. The reader of a 
legal text containing legal terms has to process the text logically, using various 
precepts and arguments to draw conclusions and understand the meaning of 
the text.3 Proceedings before EU courts depart f rom national legal practice 
most significantly with respect to establishing the facts of a case. Due to the 
special nature of such proceedings, EU courts rarely establish the facts of a 
case themselves, instead expecting litigants to present the facts thoroughly 
and credibly. At the same time, legal interpretation plays a central role. 
EU courts are responsible for interpreting EU law, and legal interpretation 
in preliminary rulings by the European Court of Justice is especially important 
for national courts called upon to apply EU law. Legal interpretation is so 
important because one of the main tools for achieving the aims of the founding 
treaties is the creation of a body of EU law which can be applied uniformly 
in all Member States.4 The ECJ is often criticised for overstepping its remit of 
providing legal interpretation5 and for playing a quasi-legislative role. 
The ECJ needs to help shape the law, as EU treaties and legislation can be 
vague, incomplete or even silent on certain matters. Also, some provisions 
leave broad scope for discretion, again allowing the Court to shape the law to 
a certain extent. 
There are several methods of interpretation of law; the earliest ones in 
history are the grammatical and the logical interpretation. The systematic 
way of interpretation had been added by the theoreticians of natural law, 
especially by the sub-school of rational law, then the first "taxonomist", Carl 
Friedrich von Savigny elaborated the system of four interpretation canons for 
the modern jurisprudence. This canon involves a series of ascending steps: 
after grammatical and logical interpretation, legal texts undergo systematic 
and historic interpretation. The special feature of EU law is that EU legal 
texts containing key legal terms are drafted in several languages. Therefore, 
proper interpretation is often achieved by supplementing the classical 
tools of legal interpretation with techniques arising f rom the special nature 
of EU law.6 These may include legal interpretation by analogy,7 classical 
4 See about importance of interpretation: STONE SWEET, ALEC: The judicial construction of Europe. 
Oxford 2004.1-45. p. 
5 See more: SCHROEDER, WERNER: DieAuslegung des EU-Rechts In: JuS 3/2004. 180-186. p. 
6 See more about legal interpretation with techniques arising from the special nature of EU law: 
COMBOS, KATALIN: Bírói jogvédelem az Európai Unióban - Lisszabon után.. Budapest, 2011. 
134-146. p. 
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dogma,8 consideration of the subjective intent of legislation9 or interpretat ion 
of the apparently more objective goal of legislation.10 Teleological (purpose 
driven) interpretation is used to analyse the concepts to which EU terms 
refer, guided by the aims laid down in the founding treaties." The principle 
of effet utile, or useful effect, means that EU terms must always be in terpreted 
with a view to effectively achieving the intent of legislation.12 In addition to 
literal and teleological interpretation, dynamic interpretation allows legal 
terms used in a particular legal context to be adapted to changing needs and 
expectations.13 
An important precept is for EU terms to be interpreted in the context of 
EU law, to which national legal terms may well prove to be poor guides.14 
One method of legal interpretation arising from the special nature of EU law 
is comparison of legal traditions, as Member States' shared traditions of ten 
help to determine the proper meaning of undefined EU terms.15 Terms may 
be interpreted by comparing various language versions of a legal text, given 
the unique multilingual nature of EU law.16 Interpretation may also be guided 
by treaties,17 legal principles,18 precedent,19 international conventions,20 
7 64/82. Tradax Graanhandel BV v. Commission of the European Communities.. ECLI:EU:C:1984:106 
12. para, T 125/96. és T 152/96. Boehringer Ingelheim Vetmedica GmbH and C.H. Boehringer Sohn 
v. Council of the European Union (T-125/96) and Commission of the European Communities (T-
152/96). ECLI:EU:T:1999:302 58. para, C 23/00. P. Council of the European Union v. Boehringer 
Ingelheim Vetmedica GmbH and C. H. Boehringer Sohn.. ECLI:EU:C:2002:118. 52. para 
6 See: KELSEN, HANS: Tiszta jogtan (Translated. Bibô, Istvân) Budapest 2001. 
9 C-267/03. Lars Erik Staffan Lindberg. ECLI:EU:C:2005:246. 30. para 
C 267/03. Lars Erik Staffan Lindberg. ECLI:EU:C:2005:246. 30. para 
" See for example requirement of principle of equivalence of procedures. 
12 LENAERTS, KOEN: L'égalité de traitement en droit communautaire. Un principe unique aux 
apparences multiples en Cahiers de droit européen, 1991. 3-41. p., particularly 38. p. 
13 218/85. Association comité économique agricole régional fruits et légumes de Bretagne v. A. Le 
Campion. ECLI:EU:C: 1986:440. 
C 443/03. Götz Leffler v. Berlin Chemie AG. ECLI:EU:C:2005:665. 45. 46. para 
15 C 119/05. Ministero dell'lndustria, del Commercio e dell'Artigianato kontra Lucchini SpA. 
ECL l:EU:C:2007:434. 
"> 29/69. Erich Stauder v. Ville d'Ulm - Sozialamt. ECLI:EU:C: 1969:57. 
17 218/82. Commission of the European Communities v. Council of the European Communities. 
ECLI:EU:C:1983:369. 15. para; 201/85. és 202/85. Marthe Klensch and others v. Secrétaire d'État 
à l'Agriculture et à la Viticulture. ECLI:EU:C:1986:439. 21. para; C-314/89. Siegfried Rauh v. 
Hauptzollamt Nürnberg-Fürth. ECLI:EU:C:1991:143. 17. para; C 98/91. A. A. Herbrink v. Minister 
van Landbouw, Natuurbeheer en Visserij. ECLI:EU:C:1994:24. 9. para, C 1/02. Privat-Molkerei 
Borgmann GmbH & Co. KG v. Hauptzollamt Dortmund. ECLI:EU:C:2004:202. 30. para 
18 C 418/97. és C 419/97. ARCO Chemie Nederland Ltd v. Minister van Volkshuisvesting, Ruimtelijke 
Ordeningen Milieubeheer (C-418/97. sz. ügy) ésVereniging Dorpsbelang Hees, StichtingWerkgroep 
Weurt-h and Vereniging Stedelljk Leefmilieu Nijmegen v. Directeur van de dienst Milieu en Water 
van deprovincie Gelderland (C-419/97. sz. ügy). ECLI:EU:C:2000:318. 37. para 
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fundamental rights,21 shared constitutional traditions of Member States,22 
moral values,23 as well as common legal traditions24 and customs.25 Determining 
the concepts to which terms refer often requires complex interpretation using 
a combination of methods.26 
One guiding principle in this effort is that EU terms must always be 
interpreted with a view to achieving the intent of legislation. Another basic 
principle is that EU terms must generally be interpreted as applying in an EU 
context. Things are fairly straightforward if EU law uses specific legal terms 
which do not appear in national law (for example, the term 'certificate of 
succession' in Regulation 650/2012/EU). 
However, many terms in EU legal texts appear identical to terms commonly 
used in national legislation, although they refer to different concepts. An 
example of this is the term 'referring court' , used in the preliminary ruling 
procedure. Whether a body is actually called a 'court' is immaterial in 
determining whether it is entitled to request a preliminary ruling. Preliminary 
rulings may be requested by other bodies as well, while some bodies called 
'courts' are not entided to request preliminary rulings if they do not meet the 
principles and conditions set out in ECJ case-law. This case-law has defined 
the term 'referring court' by specifying certain conditions which a body must 
meet in order to request a preliminary ruling.27 These include whether the 
body is established by law, whether it is permanent, whether its jurisdiction is 
" See the reasoning of of the Commission in the case C 389/05. Commission of the European 
Communities v. French Republic. 
20 C 344/04. The Queen, on the application of International Air Transport Association and European 
Low Fares Airline Association v. Department for Transport. ECLI:EU:C:2006:10. 35. para 
21C-311/04. Algemene Scheeps Agentuur Dordrecht BV v. Inspecteur der Belastingdienst -
Douanedistrict Rotterdam. ECLI:EU:C:2006:23. 25. para, C-61/94. Commission of the European 
Communities v. Federal Republic of Germany. ECLI:EU:C:1996:313. 52. para, C-286/02. Bellio F.lli 
v. Prefettura diTreviso. ECLI:EU:C:2004:212. 33. para 
22 Art. 6. TEU 
23 C 275/92. Her Majesty's Customs and Excise v. Gerhart Schindler es Jörg Schindler. 
ECLI:EU:C:1994:119. 58. para, C 124/97. Markku Juhani Läärä, Cotswold Microsystems Ltd es 
Oy Transatlantic Software Ltd v. Kihlakunnansyyttäjä (Jyväskylä) es Suomen valtio (Etat finlandais). 
ECLI:EU:C:1999:435. 33. para 
24 C 36/02. Omega Spielhallen- und Automatenaufsteilungs-GmbH v. Oberbürgermeisterin der 
Bundesstadt Bonn. ECLI:EU:C:2004:614. 36. para, C 438/05. International Transport Workers' 
Federation, Finnish Seammen's Union v. Viking LineABP, OÜ Viking Line Eesti. ECLI:EU:C:2007:772. 
75. para 
25 T 222/99, T 327/99 es T 329/99. Jean-Claude Martinez, Charles de Gaulle, Front national and Emma 
Bonino and Others v. European Parliament joined cases. ECLI:EU:T:2001:242. 
26 283/81. Sri CILFIT es Lanificio di Gavardo SpA v. Ministero della sanitä. ECLI:EU:C:1982:335. 
27 C-96/04. Standesamt Stadt Niebüll v. Stefan Grunkin, Dorothee Regina Paul. ECLI:EU:C:2006:254. 
12. para 
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compulsory, whether its procedure is inter partes, whether it applies rules of 
law28 and whether it is independent and impartial.29 The term was refined and 
certain aspects made relative in the Hungarian Cartesio case.30 The ECJ has 
often indicated that national legal terms may be poor guides in the context 
of EU law. 
Things can be even trickier when EU texts contain terms which refer to 
different concepts in different Member States because of differences in legal 
systems. When this happens, comparing legal traditions can provide a useful 
guide to interpretation. This was the case with the term 'legal force', which 
refers to different concepts in different countries.31 Such comparisons, based 
on serious legal research, can be found at the ECJ's Library, Research and 
Documentation Service. EU judicial documents also refer to such studies.32 
Comparisons of legal traditions based on legal bibliographical research33 and 
analysis can shed light on out how terms are used in a specific context. This 
was the case with the Advocate General's opinion34 on the rules for the service 
of documents and with the judgment later handed down.35 
If legislators consider it necessary for a term in a legal text to be interpreted 
consistently and properly, they provide a definition of the term in the text.36 
28 C 53/03. Farmakopoion Aitolias & Akarnanias (Syfait) és társai v. GlaxoSmithKline pic and others. 
ECLI:EU:C:2005:333. 29. para, C 246/05. Armin Häupl v. Lidi Stiftung & Co. KG. C-246/05. 
16. para, 61/65. G. Vaassen-Göbbels (a widow) v Management of the Beambtenfonds voor het 
Mijnbedrijf. ECLI:EU:C:1966:39. 395. para, C 54/96. Dorsch Consult Ingenieurgesellschaft mbH 
v. Bundesbaugesellschaft Berlin mbH. ECLI:EU:C:1997:413. 23. para, C 111/94. Job Centre Coop. 
ARL. ECLl:EU:C:1995:340. 9. para, C 195/98. Österreichischer Gewerkschaftsbund, Gewerkschaft 
öffentlicher Dienst v. Austrian Republic. ECLI:EU:C:2000:655. 24. para, C 110/98-C 147/98. 
Gabalfrisa SL and others v. Agencia Estatal de Administración Tributaria (AEAT). ECLI:EU:C:2000:145. 
33. para, C 516/99. Walter Schmid. ECLI:EU:C:2002:313. 34. para, C 416/96. Nour Eddline El-
Yassini v. Secretary of State for Home Department. ECLI:EU:C:1999:107. 17. para 
29 14/86. Pretore di Salo v. X.. ECLI:EU:C:1987:275. 7. para, 338/85. Fratelli Pardini SpA v. Ministero 
del commercio con Testero és Banca toscana (filiale di Lucca). ECLI:EU:C:1988:194. 9. para, 
C-17/00. François De Coster v. Collège des bourgmestre et échevins de Watermael-Boitsfort. 
ECLI:EU:C:2001:651. 17. para 
30 C-210/06. Cartesio Oktató és Szolgáltató bt. ECLI:EU:C:2008:723. 
31 C 119/05. Lucchini. ECLI:EU:C:2007:434 
32 Opinion ofAdvocat General Ceelhoed delivered on 14 September2006 in case C-119/05. (Ministero 
delTlndustria, del Commercio e delTArtigianatov. Lucchini Siderúrgica SpA) ECLI:EU:C:2006:576. 
37. para 
33 See more: BENACCHIO, GIANNANTONIO: Az Európai Közösség magánjoga Polgári jog- Ke-
reskedelmi jog Budapest 2003. 47-55. p. and GRAZIANO, THOMAS KADNER.: Összehasonlító 
szerződési jog. (Translated: BÓKA, JÁNOS). Budapest, 2010. 
34 Opinion ofAdvocat General Stix-Hackl delivered on 28 June 2005 in case C 443/03. (Götz Leffler 
v. Berlin Chemie AG) ECLI:EU:C:2005:409. 26. para 
35 C 443/03. Leffler. ECLI:EU:C:2005:665. 
38 See more: GOMBOS 2012. 22-33. p. 
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Such definitions are generally placed in the explanatory provisions of a legal 
text. In this way, legislators make it clear to courts how to interpret and where 
to apply the terms in a legal text. If legislators do not consider it necessary to 
define such terms, the terms must be interpreted by courts. Legal interpretation 
helps courts understand the terms in legal texts and the concepts to which 
they refer. 
Thus, legal terms can be defined either in formal definitions or through 
the ECJ providing legal interpretation and sometimes helping to shape the 
law. It is easy to see, especially for fundamental terms, that definitions in legal 
texts play a major role in ensuring uniform interpretation of the law. One 
aim of the European Area of Freedom, Security and Justice is to establish a 
single area of justice. This means ensuring proper access to law and justice, 
which can be promoted by a conscious effort to standardise the terms used 
in EU legislation. 
Let us take a few examples. 
a.) The ECJ ruled on 20 May 2010 in case C-l 11/09, Ceskä podnikatelskä 
pojistovna as, Vienna Insurance Group v. Michal Bilas.37 In this judgment 
the Court ruled that Article 24 of Regulation (EC) No 44/2001 must 
be interpreted as meaning that a breach of Chapter II, Section 3 of the 
Regulation must lead the court seized to claim jurisdiction if a defendant 
appears before that court and does not contest itsjurisdiction, as appearing 
before the court amounts to a tacit prorogation of jurisdiction. Clearly, a 
legal definition settling the relatively straightforward question of whether 
a defendant 's appearance before a court amounts to a tacit prorogation of 
jurisdiction would have obviated the need for a preliminary ruling. 
b.) The ECJ ruled on 7 December 2010 injoined cases C-585/08 (Peter Pammer 
v. Reederei Karl Schlüter GmbH & Co KG) and C-144/09 (Hotel Alpenhof 
GesmbH v. Oliver Heller) ,38 The Court made the following findings: 
a. A contract for a voyage by freighter, as in the main proceedings in 
case C-585/08, amounts to a contract for a combination of travel and 
accommodation for an inclusive price, under Article 15(3) of Regulation 
44/2001. 
37 C-111/09. Ceskä podnikatelskä pojistovna as, Vienna Insurance Croup v. Michal Bilas 
ECLI:EU:C:2010:290 
38 C-585/08. (Peter Pammer v. Reederei Karl Schlüter GmbH & Co KC) and C-144/09. (Hotel Alpenhof 
GesmbH v. Oliver Heller) joined cases. ECLI:EU:C:2010:740. 
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b. In order to determine whether a trader whose activity is presented on its 
website or that of an intermediary can be considered to be 'directing' its 
activity to the Member State of a consumer's domicile within the meaning 
ofArticle 15(1) (c) ofRegulation 44/2001, i tshould be ascertained whether 
those websites and the trader's overall activity before concluding any 
contract with the consumer indicated that the trader planned to conclude 
contracts for business with consumers domiciled in one or more Member 
States, including the Member State of that consumer's domicile. 
These two findings would have been unnecessary or at least much easier 
to make if EU legislators had been more consistent, using the same terms to 
refer to the same concepts in EU legal instruments covering related matters, 
as was the case in the preparatory documents, a n d / o r defining those terms in 
the preparatory documents. 
These examples illustrate the need for attention to defining terms in 
legislation to avoid future problems of interpretation, which make things 
more difficult for courts. 
3. Problems arising directly from multilingualism of EU law 
Some mistakes in translation cannot be avoided by legal interpretation 
or cannot be avoided at all. In cases of doubt, it is sometimes necessary to 
compare different language versions of an EU legal text, as they may turn ou t 
to mean different things and produce different legal effects. The ECJ gave 
express consideration to differences between language versions in 246 of the 
8978 cases which led to judgments between 1960 and 2010. 
Some examples of problems due to differences in language versions: 
In the 90 /83 Paterson judgment,39 different language versions ofRegulat ion 
543/69 and the lack of a comma in one language led to a need for legal 
interpretation. A minor syntactic difference between language versions was the 
basis for the easyCar judgment4 0 in case C 336/03, requiring an interpretation 
ofArticle 3(2) ofRegulation 97 /7 by the Court. 
Mistakes in translation can often be due to overly complex structure in EU 
legislation, such as texts full of bullet points and subparagraphs with opaque 
cross-references. 
39 90/83. Michael Paterson and others v. W. Weddel & Company Limited and others. 
ECLI:EU:C:1984:123 
40 C-336/03. easyCar (UK) Ltd v. Office of Fair Trading. ECLI:EU:C:2005:150 
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Another typical source of mistakes is the confusion caused by transferring terms 
directly from one language to another despite partial or complete differences in 
meaning (e.g. in Hungarian law aktus (act) and jogi aktus (legal act)). 
A particular problem is when terms from one legal system or language are 
used in legal texts even though they do not exist or refer to different concepts 
in other legal systems,e.g. FR: faute (fault), grief (objection, point, argument) 
or raison d 'ordre public (overriding reason, bar to proceedings, matter of 
public policy, general interest) .41 
The names of EU institutions are also rendered inconsistendy in some 
languages - a problem which could surely be mitigated by standardising 
translations published in the Official Journal (See table attached.).42 
Problems may arise involving turns of phrase particular to a given language, 
e.g. EN: 'first come, first served' (Article 4 of Regulation (EU) No 1234/2009) 
or 'as the crow flies' (Article 3(5) of Directive 2007/74/EU); FR: sans préjudice 
(subject to, notwithstanding).43 
One of the biggest problems for courts in applying EU law is inconsistent 
terminology. Some legal instruments use different terms to refer to the 
same legal construct or the same term to refer to different legal constructs. 
It is particularly problematic if a legal text refers to the same concept using 
different terms which refer to different legal concepts in different countries 
(e.g. Directive 85/577: HU 3: elállás, felmondás, visszavonás, FR 2: résilier, 
renoncer, EN 3: cancel, waive, renounce, DE 2: Widerruf, RücktrittjDirective 
93/13: HU 2: felmondás, felbontás, FR 3: renoncer, rompre, résilier, DE 3: 
unterlassen, kündigen, Rücktritt, EN 2 : dissolve, cancel). 
It is also a problem if legal texts covering related matters use different terms 
to refer to the same concept or the same term to refer to different concepts (e.g. 
consumer protection rules: the 'right of withdrawal' is regulated differendy in 
Directives 85/577/EEC, 94 /47 /EC, 9 7 / 7 / E C and 2002/65/EC). 
A particularly unfortunate practice in drafting legislation is circular 
definitions, i.e. definitions which contain the terms being defined (e.g. Article 
2 of Directive 2004/35: the definition of 'environmental damage' contains the 
term 'damage', which is not defined in the Directive and refers to different 
concepts in different national legal systems). 
41 Examples from József Villányi, Head of Unit DG Trad - Hungarian Translation Unit European Parla-
ment, Luxembourg 
42 The exampe from William Robinson. See: ROBINSON, WILLIAM - GUGGEIS, MANUELA: 
'Corevision': Legal-Linguistic Revision In The European Union 'Codecision' Process." in: The Role of 
Legal Translation in Legal Harmonisation, Kluwer Law International July 2012. 77. p. 
43 Examples from William Robinson. See: ROBINSON, WILLIAM - MBOS OONIOMOLA A 2012. 
75. p. 
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Courts can make serious mistakes in applying EU law if legal instruments 
use seemingly trivial legal terms which are not explained or defined and refer 
to different legal concepts in different national legal systems (e.g. Directive 
93/13/EEC: the term 'contract' is not defined, so that the scope of the 
Directive could vary from one Member State to the next). 
A similar problem arises if seemingly legal terms are used in legal texts bu t 
do not refer to a specific legal concept in national or EU law (e.g. 'tax f raud ' , 
'tax evasion', 'tax avoidance', 'unintended non-taxation').44 
Mistakes in translation can be remedied through corrigenda, though this 
makes it harder to find the version of a legal text which is actually in force in a 
given language in EUR-Lex, the EU's official repository of legal texts. In Hun-
gary, courts can search for national legislation using a special standard-format, 
updated search engine with a time machine function, which is much easier 
than searching for EU legislation. 
4. Summary 
If we made a chart of steps needed to ensure the proper application of EU law, 
the first step would be providing more definitions of legal terms, which would 
avoid many problems of interpretation. The second step could be properly 
informing courts applying EU law of the special methods of legal interpretation 
arising from EU law; establishing a principle of primacy in interpretation,45 as 
proposed, would help achieve this aim. The third step could be making a 
greater effort to standardise46 private and criminal EU law, which could go a 
long way towards creating a consistent, general and self-contained body of EU 
legal terms and concepts. 
'Passarelle-clauses' could be built between the various steps, with legal 
research playing a major role in creating a consistent, cross-disciplinary 
body of EU legal terms. More multilingual legal dictionaries and glossaries 
should also be prepared with definitions of EU legal terms. Since the p roper 
application of EU law depends on the attitude of national courts, one way 
to help them could be by extending the practice of amicus curiae, currently 
44 Examples from József Villányi, Head of Unit DC Trad- Hungarian Translation Unit European Pária-
ment, Luxembourg 
45 See about principle of primacy in interpretation: COMBOS, KATALIN: A jogértelmezés jelentősége a 
közösségi jogban - avagy az értelmezési elsődlegesség elvéről, in: Európai jog, 2010./2. 3-10. p. 
46 See more: COMBOS, KATALIN: A polgári és kereskedelmi ügyekben folytatott igazságügyi 
együttműködés jelenlegi helyzete az Európai Unióban, in: FORUM. Acta Universitatis Szegediensis: 
Acta juridica et politica. 2013./ 2. 49-65. p. 
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used only in EU competition law, to other areas such as internal market law 
and matters relating to cross border disputes. These questions were raised in 
one Hungarian request for a preliminary ruling,47 but the Court did not have 
jurisdiction to rule on the matter. Still, EU legislators, legal experts and courts 
should give greater consideration to such questions in future. 
Annex 
Hungarian English French Spanish Swedish 
Bíróság Court of Cour de Tribunal Domstolen 
Justice justice de Justicia 
Törvényszék General Tribunal Tribunal Tribunalen 
Court 
Közszolgálati Civil Service Tribunal de Tribunal de Personaldomstolen 
Törvényszék Tribunal la fonction la Función 
publique Pública 
47 C-56/13. Érsekcsanádi Mezőgazdasági Zrt v. Bács-Kiskun Megyei Kormányhivatal. 
ECU:EU:C:2014:352. 
